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RIGHTS TO FUNDS WITHHELD FROM DEFAULTING GENERAL
CONTRACTORS: SURETY v. TAX COLLECTOR*
A GENERAL contractor's default on a job undertaken creates many trouble-
some commercial problems. Among the most perplexing of these is the conflict
between the claims of the contractor's surety 1 and the federal tax collector to
funds retained by the owner. 2 Although the owner normally makes periodic
payments for work completed, he retains specified percentages of each install-
ment until completion. When the contractor defaults, the owner usually ex-
ercises his right to require the surety to complete, but withholds the balance
of the contract price.3 Under the usual rule of subrogation a surety who satisfies
the claims of his principal's creditors acquires the rights of those creditors and
any security held by them ;4 the surety accordingly claims that he is entitled to the
*Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. New York City Housing Authority, No. 24196, 2d Cir.,
Feb. 8, 1957, reversing 140 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
1. The commercial surety company undertakes, in a bond executed between it as
surety and the contractor as principal, to protect the owner of the contemplated project
from the loss he may suffer if the contractor fails to perform, to complete the actual
work itself should the owner so request after the contractor's default, and to pay all
claims of materialmen, laborers and subcontractors arising out of the work should the
contractor leave these claims unsatisfied. The limit of the surety's liability in all cases
is set by the so-called "penal sum" specified in the bond. Bill Curphy Co. v. Elliott, 207
F2d 103 (5th Cir. 1953).
The surety thus functions as a general insurer of performance for the contract price.
This makes practicable a highly competitive system of job-bidding, for the owner may
accept the lowest competent bid with nearly full assurance of performance at that price.
Cf. BACKMAI, SURETY RATE-MAxiNG 246 (1948); Haas, The Corporate Surety and
Public Construction Bonds, 25 GEo. WASH. L. Ry. 206 (1957).
2. Typically these claims stem from the contractor's failure to pay over both taxes with-
held from his employees wages, see IN'T. REv. CoDne OF 1954, §§ 3402-03 (imposing on
employers the duty to withhold, and making them liable for, income tax from employees'
wages), and taxes assessed directly against the contractor's business, see, 'e.g., id. §§ 3111,
3301 (Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes and employment taxes).
3. See Record on Appeal, p. 60, Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Horticultural "Service,
136 N.Y.L.J. No. 112, p. 7, col. 4 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 12, 1956), reversing 1. Misc. 2d
956, 147 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (reproducing New York City Housing Authority
contract clauses). For a different type of payment clause also in general use, see P xR
& ADAMS, THE A. I. A. STANDARD CONTRACr Foims AND THE LAW 25 (1954).
4. Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896); Henningsen
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 208 U.S. 404, 410 (1908) ; Glenn v. American
Surety Co., 160 F.2d 977, 981 (6th Cir. 1947); Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 264 N.Y. 159, 163, 190 N.E. 330, 332 (1934);
ef. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Centropolis Bank, 17 F.2d 913 (8th Cir.
1927). See also cases collected in Annot., 134 A.L.R. 738, 742 (1941.). But see Aetna Cas.
& Surety Co. v. Horticultural Service, 1 Misc. 2d 956, 147 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 1956y,
rev'd, 136 N.Y.L.J. No. 112, p. 7, col. 4 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 12, 1956).
The completing surety also acquires the owner's right of action against the contractor.
This is as valueless as the surety's right of reimbursement from his principal for the
contractor is generally insolvent or close to it at the time he defaults. The surety also
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withheld portions of each installment and the balance of the contract price
as security held by the owner.5 Countering this argument is the tax col-
lector's claim to the funds for taxes arising both prior to and out of the bonded
job.
As against claims for on-the-job taxes, the surety's contentions have long
been sustained; the courts "related back" the surety's interest in the retained
funds to the time the bond was executed. 6 Then, applying a first-in-time-first-
in-right theory, courts protected the surety from claims for taxes arising after
the contract was signed as well as from those of the contractor's subsequent
creditors.7 The federal government has usually prevailed over the surety
on prior tax claims by asserting a lien under section 6321 of the Internal
Revenue Code.8
may acquire the rights of subcontractors whose claims he has paid. However, as one of the
main purposes of the surety's bond is to hold the owner harmless from these claims, he
may not himself urge them as against the owner.
"Completion" in this context means either the performance of the physical work re-
quired by the contract, Century Cement Mfg. Co. v. Fiore, 264 App. Div. 475, 36
N.Y.S.2d 332 (3d Dep't 1942) ; Henningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
supra, or the payment of all claims which the contract requires the contractor to pay,
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Miller, 143 F. Supp. 941 (W.D.N.C. 1956);
F. H. McGraw & Co. v. Sherman Plastering Co., 60 F. Supp. 504 (D. Conn. 1943);
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 297 N.Y. 31,
74 N.E.2d 226 (1947).
5. See cases cited note 4 supra. Were there no surety bond involved the owner would by
the terms of the contract have the right to apply the contract balance and retained per-
centages to the completion of the job after the general contractor's default. McKnight v.
United States, 98 U.S. 179, 186 (1878) ; Gratiot v. United States, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 336,
370 (1841). And when the owner does elect to complete the job himself, his claim
against the surety is reduced by the amount of the contract balance and retained percentages.
6. The fact that the surety's right has neither an ascertainable value nor is enforceable
until he has completed payment or performance has never disturbed the courts. See, e.g.,
Heningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908) ; United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sweeney, 80 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1935) ; National Surety Corp.
v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
7. Under the "first-in-time-first-in-right" theory the surety's subrogation interest is
regarded generally as an "equitable lien." It accordingly has been held superior to subse-
quent statutory liens, see, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Triborough Bridge
Authority, 297 N.Y. 31, 37, 74 N.E.2d 226, 227 (1947) (federal tax lien), and consensual
liens, see, e.g., Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896) (assignment of
accounts receivable). See, generally, cases collected in Annot., 134 A.L.R. 738 (1941).
8. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321: "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or
refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the
United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belong-
ing to such person."
The lien arises at the time the assessment lists are received by the tax collector's office.
INT. RZv. CODE OF 1954, § 6322. It continues in effect until the liability for such amount
is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time; the lien is invalid as
against mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers and judgment creditors unless notice of the
lien has been filed in accordance with the law of the state wherein the property subject
to the lien is situated. For typical state requirements, see, e.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW § 240
(Supp. 1956) (notice to be filed in the office of the county clerk, city register, or town
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More recently, however, the government's argument was successful in a
federal district court as to both prior and on-the-job taxes. In the recent
case of Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. United States 9 the surety
had given bonds securing performance of all work required by the contract and
securing payment of all materialmen's and laborers' claims arising on the job. 10
The contractor completed the work but failed to pay all outstanding claims.
The surety completed payment of the claims covered by its bond. The federal
government, seeking taxes owed by the contractor for the bonded and prior
jobs, and the surety both claimed the fund retained by the owner, The
government argued, and the district court held, that the surety had no claim
to the funds either in his own right or by subrogation to the rights of the
materialmen and laborers or the owner.' 2 Although, under the contract, the
or city clerk); CoNx. GEN. STAT. § 7213 (1949) (notice to be filed in lands records
office or office of town clerk). When the state makes no provision for filing, the lien
may be perfected by filing in the district court. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 6323.
9. No. 24196, 2d Cir., Feb. 8, 1957, reversing 140 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
10. 140 F. Supp. at 300. See also Record on Appeal, p. 60 (facing), Aetna Cas. &
Surety Co. v. Horticultural Service, 136 N.Y.L.J. No. 1.12, p. 7, col. 4 (N.Y. App. Div.
Dec. 12, 1956) (standard form of bond required by the New York City Housing Authority).
11. 140 F. Supp. at 301-03.
12. Id. at 301-03. In concluding that the surety was not subrogated to the rights of
the owner, the court relied on United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947).
There the federal government was the owner. The Court held that the government
was promisee of only the performance bond and that no retained percentages or other
withheld monies may be considered as held as security for the payment of unpaid laborers
and materialmen. But see National Surety Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct.
Cl. 1955); Martin v. National Surety Co., 300 U.S. 588 (1937) ; Trinity Universal Ins.
Co. v. Gray, CCH 1957 STAND. FED. TAX REP. ff 9297 (M.D. Ga.).
The basis for the Munsey holding lies in the government's unique immunity from
materialmen's and laborers' liens. The government is responsible only morally for pay-
ment, as no liens may be filed against federal projects. See, e.g., Equitable Surety Co. v.
NMcMillan, 234 U.S. 448, 455 (1914); Hill v. American Surety Co., 200 U.S. 197, 203
(1906). See 49 STAT. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270(a)-(d) (1952) (Miller Act). The
private owner, however, has a very real liability for liens. He therefore requires the
contractor to furnish a payment bond, and he should be treated as the promisee thereof.
Admittedly, under the lien laws of some states, the owner's liability to unpaid subcontrac-
tors is extinguished if payment of the full contract price is made before the liens
are filed. See, e.g., N.Y. LIE:N LAW § 4 (Supp. 1956) ; CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7220 (1949).
But see MAss. ANN. LAws c.254, §§ 1-4 (1956) ; OHio R v. STAT. § 1311.02 (Supp. 1956).
Under the installment payment system, however, since full payment is never made and
liens may be filed immediately upon delivery of materials or performance of labor, this
rule seldom comes into play. Nor does the notice provided by filing fully protect the
owner. He may, after receiving notice of lien, protect himself from out-of-pocket loss
by holding back funds in the amount of the lien. He then can either settle directly with
the lienors or pay the money into court. See, e.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW § 20 (Supp. 1956).
But this may seriously curtail the flow of monies to the general contractor and there-
fore to the job. The owner runs the risk of subcontractor defaults and a breakdown of the
building schedule in general. The government's freedom from liability permits it to
continue channeling funds into the job, leaving the claimants to go against the surety.
The owner of a non-federal job requires the corresponding protection offered him by the
19571
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
owner's duty to pay the contractor arose only when the latter had paid all
claims promptly, the court held that the contractor had a right to the retained
percentages. It accordingly held that the federal tax lien attached to this
"right to property" and awarded the entire fund to the government for past
and current taxes.18
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, reversed.14 It held
that Congress did not intend by section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code to
confer power on the federal courts to decide whether a taxpayer has a property
interest, but solely to examine whatever property interests are created by
state law and to determine whether such interests are "property" or "rights
to property" to which the statutory tax lien attaches.'5 The existence of a
property interest being a question of state law, the court felt itself bound
by a New York decision. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Triborough Bridge Authority 16 the New York Court of Appeals had held
that as long as unsatisfied materialmen's and laborers' claims were outstanding
and as long as the owner had the right to withhold and apply the fund, the
contractor had no property interest to which the federal tax lien might attach.
The Second Circuit further held, relying again on state decisions, that since
the general contractor's failure to pay such claims was a material breach of
contract, there was no property interest by way of right of recovery under
a substantial performance theory.'1  Consequently, the court denied the gov-
ernment any part of the fund.
payment bond. Further, the assurance of payment the bond offers the subcontractors
benefits the owner by tending to lower initial bid-prices. Thus, for a variety of reasons
foreign to the government-as-owner situation, the private owner is very definitely the
promisee of the payment bond, and withheld funds may be properly deemed security for
payment as well as performance.
13. 140 F. Supp. at 301-03. See also Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Horticultural
Service, 1 Misc. 2d 956, 147 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 1956), which reached an identical
result, but by different reasoning. The court there rejected the relation back doctrine
and held that the surety's interest was an "inchoate" lien and therefore inferior to the
federal tax lien which was "choate" the moment the assessment lists were filed. This
allowed recovery on all tax liens, including those arising prior to the job, during it, and
after completion. Cf. United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956),
reversing without opiono. 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Colotta, 350
U.S. 808 (1955), reversing without opinion 79 So. 2d 474 (Miss. 1955).
14. Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. New York City Housing Authority, No. 24196, 2d
Cir., Feb. 8, 1957, reversing 140 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
15. Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. New York City Housing Authority, No. 24196, 2d
Cir., Feb. 8, 1957, at 582.
16. 297 N.Y. 31, 37, 74 N.E.2d 226, 227 (1947).
17. Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. New York City Housing Authority, No. 24196, 2d
Cir., Feb. 8, 1957, at 586, citing Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889
(1921) ; Dauchey v. Drake, 85 N.Y. 407 (1881) ; Spence v. Ham, 163 N.Y. 220, 57 N.E.
412 (1900) ; Cassino v. Yacevich, 261 App. Div. 685, 27 N.Y.S.2d 95 (3d Dep't 1941);
Gompert v. Healy, 149 App. Div. 198, 133 N.Y. Supp. 689 (2d Dep't 1912).
The government, however, has consistently urged that private contractual provisions
-in this case making all performance a condition precedent to receipt of withheld per-
centages-cannot derogate the rights acquired by the government under the tax statutes.
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The Second Circuit need not have felt bound by state law. The distinction
between the creation of interests, governed by state law, and the classification
of such interests as property rights by the federal courts was based on a
Supreme Court dictum; the holding actually tends to contradict the Second
Circuit's reasoning.'8 The court might have concluded that in order to achieve
uniformity in tax results 19 the existence of property interests subject to tax
liens should be decided under federal law. Alternatively, state law does not
compel the conclusion that the contractor has no interest in the fund when he
has defaulted and the surety completes his contract. Triborough, for example,
negated the contractor's interest "so long as" material and labor claims were
outstanding20 But once the surety pays these claims the contractor's right is
no longer conditioned. State law then gives the surety a right superior to that
of the contractor to implement the surety's right of reimbursement ;21 conse-
quently, since the tax collector can only claim against the contractor's rights,
the surety prevails. The federal court could have concluded that since the
litigation concerned federal taxes, the question of priorities became one of federal
law and the surety's rights should have been subordinated.22 Because the
United States v. Kings County Iron Works, 224 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955) ; United States
v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 198 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1952). It has therefore been urged
that the contractor's interest in any funds which have been earned is a right to property sub-
ject to the tax lien, notwithstanding contractual provisions limiting the contractor's right to
payment.
If successful, however, this argument might give the government monies which the
contractor never actually earned. The contractor may pad the work estimate on which
the owner's periodic payments are based. The payments actually received by the contractor
before his default could then be equal to or even in excess of the full measure of his
performance.
18. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940). Plaintiff's decedent was the
legatee of two powers of appointment over property held in two trusts created under
her father's will. Since § 302(f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1926, 44 STAT. 71, in-
cluded only general, not special, powers of appointment within the category of rights
subject to the estate tax, the issue was whether the powers were special or general. The
Court stated that its task was one of classifying already existing interests, not of de-
termining whether such interests existed. Then despite the fact that the state court had
classified the power as special and had held that no general power existed, the Court
held that the power was the type of interest Congress intended to tax as a general
power. See also Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944).
19. See, e.g., Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938); Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v.
Hoey, 117 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Weil v. United States, 115 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1940).
20. 297 N.Y. at 37, 74 N.E.2d at 227.
21. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Triborough Bridge Authority,
for example, the court would have reached the same result had it initially assumed that
the contractor had a present unconditional right to the fund. Courts of equity may sub-
ordinate the contractor's right to the claim of a surety to whom the contractor owes
a duty of reimbursement. See cases cited note 4 supra. All that was therefore essential
to the court's decision was this rule of equity and a determination that the government's
right was inferior to that of the surety. For similar state decisions see, e.g., Fosmire v.
National Surety Co., 229 N.Y. 44, 127 N.E. 472 (1920).
22. The question of relative priorities where a federal lien is involved has become
a matter for exclusive federal determination. United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808
1957]
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circuit court could have concluded differently,2 3 the main support for the de-
cision must rest on the practicality of the results it reaches.
In effect, the decision prevents the government from asserting a "secret"
lien--one that would be condemned in the hands of a private creditor.24 Char-
acteristically, in litigation between the tax collector and the completing surety,
the government seeks to collect not only taxes which arose from the current
job but also taxes that are due from the contractor's past jobs and have ac-
cumulated for several years prior to his current default.25 The government
had collection machinery available to it during this period; instead of deferring
(1955) (mechanic's lien) ; United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955) (distress war-
rant); United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955)
(garnishment) ; United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955) (attachment) ; United States
v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954) (municipal tax liens, mortgages, and water rent liens) ;
United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953) (municipal tax liens
arising out of ad valorem assessments) ; United States v. Kings County Iron Works, 224
F2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955) (mechanic's liens). But see Karno-Smith Co. v. Maloney, 112
F.2d 690, 692 (3d Cir. 1940) ; F. H. McGraw & Co. v. Sherman Plastering Co., 60 F.
Supp. 504 (D. Conn. 1943). For criticism of this rule, and the history of its development,
see Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government, 63 YALE L.J. 905
(1954).
23. See note 13 supra and accompanying text; cf. American Radiator Co. v. New
York, 223 N.Y. 193, 119 N.E. 391 (1918). In the principal case the Second Circuit fails to
draw any distinction between the different types of monies included in the contested fund.
The consistent use of the term "balance" has tended to obscure the divided nature of
the fund which may be comprised of retained percentages (earned but not due), sums
fortuitously unpaid at default (earned and due but not paid) and finally, the actual
balance of the contract price (unearned, not due and unpaid). The contractor's rights
on default vary on each of these elements. See, e.g., Cassino v. Yacevich, 261 App. Div.
685, 27 N.Y.S.2d 95 (3d Dep't 1941); Venmar v. Scott Realty Co., 24 N.Y.S.2d 189
(Sup. Ct. 1940) ; Nieman-Irving & Co. v. Lazenby, 263 N.Y. 91, 188 N.E. 265 (1933). See
also cases cited note 19 supra (federal tax questions should not be controlled by varying
state determinations of property relationships).
24. See, e.g., Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), 39 HARV. L. Rv. 253; 1 WASH.
L. REV. 47. See also Countryman, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial
Code and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 76 (1951); Liv-
ingston & Kearns, Commercial Financing and the Relation Between Secured and Un-
secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 609 (1948).
25. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Triborough Bridge Authority,
297 N.Y. 31, 74 N.E.2d 226 (1947) ; Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Horticultural Service,
1 Misc. 2d 956, 147 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 1956) ; R. F. Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs,
146 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex. 1956) ; cf. United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955).
26. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7403.
Further, the government could have instituted criminal proceedings against the de-
linquent contractor; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7203 (willful failure to file return, supply
information or pay the required tax is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more
than $10,000 and imprisonment for not more than one year) ; id., § 7202 (willful failure to
collect or pay over any tax imposed is a felony subject to a maximum fine of $10,000 and
five years imprisonment) ; id., § 7201 (any attempt to defeat or evade tax is a felony and
subject to § 7202 penalties).
The statute of limitations is three years on criminal prosecutions and six years for
criminal prosecutions of willful violations. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6531. See also
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attempts to collect, it could have foreclosed its liens as they arose.26 Such
enforcement devices always involve the risk of precipitating the contractor's
financial ruin, and consequently of reducing the chances that he will eventu-
ally be able to pay. The government, therefore, frequently gambles, waiting
in the hope that the delinquent contractor will recover his footing.27 But the
government hedges its gamble at the expense of the surety and other creditors
of the contractor. By filing its assessment lists in the collector's office, the
government obtains a statutory lien under section 6321.28 As a practical matter,
the surety and creditors will seldom be able to learn of the lien.29 If the
contractor's financial condition worsens and he eventually defaults, the govern-
ment then hopes that under a first-in-time-first-in-right theory, its lien will
take precedence over unsecured claims.30
It is, however, undesirable to bar the government, as both the Second Circuit
and Triborough views do, from collecting taxes which arose on the construc-
tion job bonded by the surety. Admittedly, the surety has not contracted to
pay these job taxes if the contractor fails to do so. 31 But the surety, who is
called upon to complete performance or payment, benefits from the contractor's
id., § 6502 (imposing a six year limit for civil actions). Iv addition, the statute begins to
run when the initial assessment list is filed, and this may be done up to three years after
the tax fell due. Id., § 6501.
27. For an official, if not particularly recent, recognition of this fact see G.C.M. 4715,
VII-2 Cum. BuLL. 94 (1928), advising the tax collector to wait and keep on the alert
as "a delinquent taxpayer may at any time prior to the expiration of the statutory period
of limitations become possessed of property against which the lien may attach, thus making
the tax liability enforceable through the lien."
Although the statement is not recent, it seems to be an accurate description of current
policy. For examples of the numerous cases which can be explained, if not by inexcusable
inefficiency, only in terms of this policy, see cases cited note 25 supra; and for very recent
cases indicating that the policy persists, see Colusa-Glenn Production Credit Ass'n v.
Phoenix Ins. Co., 145 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Cal. 1956) ; United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Miller, 143 F. Supp. 941, (W.D.N.C. 1956); Damato v. Leone Constr. Co., 41 N.J.
Super. 366 (App. Div. 1956).
28. See note 8 supra.
29. Assessment lists filed in the tax collector's office may be examined only if a power
of attorney has been obtained from the contractor. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6103; T.D.
4929 § 463C.2, in 2 P-H 1954 FED. TAX SERV. 17902.
For a discussion of the practical difficulties of searching the tax collector's records
and suggested remedies, see Rudolph, Perfornunce Bond Servicing of Government Con-
tracts, 19 INs. COUNSEL J. 171, 177 (1952).
30. See cases cited note 13 supra.
31. The bond does not include federal taxes among the enumerated claims for which
the surety is responsible. See typical bond provisions, note 10 mtpra. In the absence of any
express inclusion and an express intent to give the claim holder a cause of action, the
government has no right of action on the bond. United States v. Crosland Constr. Co., 217
F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Great American Indemnity Co. v. United States, 120 F. Supp.
445, 448 (W.D. La. 1954); McGrath v. American Surety Co., 307 N.Y. 552, 122 N.E.2d
906 (1954); cf. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 201 F.2d 118,
120 (10th Cir. 1952). But cf. United States v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 231 F.2d 573 (4th
Cir. 1956).
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failure to pay job taxes as they fall due. In most cases the contractor's default
is caused by a combination of inadequacy of capital and unexpected or mis-
calculated costs. 32 Except in the unlikely event that the contractor's success in
forestalling the tax collector encourages him to increase his non-business
spending,33 by deferring his tax payments the contractor increases his available
capital. This increases the amount of performance he can complete before
default and correspondingly decreases the loss incurred by the completing
surety.
The best solution can be reached by a system of notice better calculated
to give the surety immediate knowledge of a contractor's failure to pay taxes.
The surety not only has a need for information regarding the contractor's
skill, business acumen and financial condition at the time he undertakes the
job, but properly informed, can best prevent losses. The surety is best able
both to judge the contractor's ability to undertake a given project and, by
virtue of his accumulated business experience, to evaluate the risks presented
by the contemplated job. In deciding whether to bond a job, if the surety
knows the amount of existing tax claims, he will be best able to determine
whether the contractor has become too indebted to be capable of completing
the job. And once the job is undertaken, if a point of excessive indebtedness
is reached, the owner may be apprised of the situation, the contractor may
be defaulted, and the job relet to a capable contractor.3 4
32. The fact that the contractor is insolvent at least in the equitable sense is evident;
if he had sufficient assets to pay his debts as they mature, the case would not arise. It
may be true, of course, that insolvency merely coincides with a willful failure to complete
the contract, or with some event (labor trouble, for example) which prevents the con-
tractor, but not the surety, from completing. Such coincidence, however, would seem
rare.
The contractor's insolvency does not necessarily mean that the government can assert
its priority under REv. STAT. §,3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1952). Legal insolvency
must first be proven. For previously unsucessful attempts by the government to use the
priority argument see, e.g., itn re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F2d 808, 809-10 (6th
Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1946) ; cf. New York
Cas. Co. v. Zwerner, 58 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1944); In re Van Winkle, 49 F. Supp.
711 (W.D. Ky. 1943). The contractor may be equitably insolvent but not legally insolvent.
And even when he is proven insolvent for § 3466 purposes, the question still would arise
whether the retained sums were part of the insolvent's estate which the statute devotes
first to paying the government. See also, for criticism of the government's approach,
Kennedy, supra note 22.
33. Since a willful failure to pay taxes may lead to criminal prosecution, see note 26
supra, it seems reasonable to infer that a contractor would only violate the statute out of
necessity, i.e., attempting to fullfil his contractual obligations.
34. Since a typical contract with the owner provides that the contractor will pay all
lawful claims promptly, his tax delinquencies may constitute a breach. See note 3 supra.
Distribution of the costs of risk protection through a rise in the premium rates is, how-
ever, unlikely. Even though the rates charged by a large part of the industry are influenced
to a degree by the rating bureau device set up under the American Surety Association,
competition is still keen. BACKMAN, SuRETY RATE-MIAKING 106 (1949). Rather than
raise rates, most companies, particularly those not members of the American Surety
Association, would probably prefer to absorb the risk, since they may expect that by
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While section 6323 (a) should be amended to require timely and effective
notice,3 5 existing doctrines can be construed to compel the same result. Since
the surety and the contractor are in effect joint obligors under the general
contract, 3 performance by either discharges the joint obligation.3 The con-
tractor then has an absolute right to payment as soon as either he or the
surety performs all the requirements of the contract and the tax lien can
attach to this right. The surety, however, can be protected against tax liens
for past taxes by obtaining from the contractor the customary assignment of
the contractor's rights under the general contract. 38 At the same time, the
assignment arrangement can be construed to allow the government to collect
maintaining lower rates they can obtain larger volumes of business whiffh will yield
an increase in profit large enough to offset the new risk. Further, should the rates rise
by any appreciable amount and the expense to the owner become too great, he may
dispense with the surety bond altogether and employ alternative security devices. This
has been done in the past by some states and municipalities, and by the federal govern-
ment on certain types of contracts during the war, and it is still done frequently on smaller
private jobs. Id. at 339-45. Fear of a repetition of such action serves as a continual and
additional curb on premium rates.
35. INT. RM. CODE OF 1954, § 6323 (a) should be revised to require the government
to file all tax liens in the district court or with the appropriate state agency before the
liens become effective as against the surety. Alternatively, or in addition, provision for
direct notice to the owner and/or surety should be made. See also MAcLACHLA , BANK-
RUPTCrY §§ 154-55 (1956) (discussion of notice provisions and priorities) ; Kennedy, supra
note 22.
36. The surety generally does not join with the contractor in signing the main
contract with the owner. He does, however, in his bond promise to pay the owner if
the contract is not performed, and performance by either the contractor or surety
discharges the surety on his bond. See SimPsoN, SuRa"rsHIP § 69 (1950); STEARs,
SuRETYSHiP § 96 (4th ed. 1934).
Thus the surety promises to pay if the contractor and surety do not perform. More-
over, the surety promises in his bond that he will perform if the owner demands that he
do so. Except for the fact that he places an upper limit on his liability, the surety there-
fore makes the same promise that he would make by signing the main contract. Had he
done so, his status as a joint obligor would be clear. See 4 CoRBIN, CoNmA.crs §§ 923-42
(1951) (hereinafter cited as CORBIN). And the fact that the surety does limit his
liability is irrelevant here, even when that limit becomes operative. A joint obligor can be
liable for only part of the total performance. 4 id. § 926.
37. 4 id. §§ 928,936-37.
38. See R. F. Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, 140 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd, 239
F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1956), where surety holding an assignment of contractor's contract
rights was held the equivalent of a mortgagee within the meaning of INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 6323 (a), and notice of lien was therefore required before the federal tax lien could be-
come effective as against the surety's interest. Filing of assessment lists in the collector's office
is not sufficient for this purpose. See note 8 supra. See also Alabama-Tennessee Natural
Gas Co. v. Lehman-Hoge & Scott, 122 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ala. 1954); accord, (a re
Allied Products Co., 134 F.2d 725 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 740 (1943) ; cf. Salem
Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1924). However, even where
the assignment is contingent on default, it may be argued that a present assignment has
been made, subject to divestment on the occurrence of a condition subsequent (i.e., success-
ful completion).
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on-the-job taxes as long as it gives prompt notice to the surety whenever
the contractor falls behind in his tax payments.
Normally, at or before the time the owner-contractor agreement is signed,
the surety takes an assignment of all the contractor's rights, privileges and
properties under the contract, including the right to all monies due or to
become due.39 The assignment is, by its terms, a present assignment. In ad-
dition, by the terms of its bond, the surety also assumes liability for perform-
ance. Thus the surety in two steps acquires the same position as he would
by taking a total assignment of the contract. The surety then in effect employs
the contractor to perform the work required on the job.40
Thus viewed in a double capacity-assignee and employer-the surety can be
freed from liability for previous tax claims the contractor had incurred and yet
made liable for on-the-job taxes of which the surety has notice. As assignee,
he has, in effect, taken the contractor's rights under the contract in return for
his promise to perform; the contractor's rights in the contract can be viewed
as security for the surety's assumption of liability. As a security holder, the
surety prevails over unrecorded tax claims existing at that time.41 But as
employer, he is liable for the contractor's subsequent refusals to pay taxes,
providing the surety has actual notice of the delinquency.
42
39. For an example of the conventional type of indemnity assignment agreement, see
Application for Contract Bond and Agreement of Indemnity (The Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.), Clause four. Record on Appeal, p. 60 (facing), Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v.
Horticultural Service, 136 N.Y.L.J. No. 112, p. 7, col. 4 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 12, 1956).
40. A clause in the owner-contractor agreement requiring permission for any assign-
ment does not militate against the suggestion in text. First, by consenting to the surety's
promise to assume liability for performance, the owner has in effect waived any objection
to the assignment. Secondly, the assignment is made in order to clarify the relationship
between the surety and the contractor and does not alter the owner's rights. See 4
CORBIN §§ 869, 906.
If, however, the requirements of the federal notice statute, INT. R y. CODE OF 1954,
§ 6323(a), have been met prior to the execution of the assignment and the bond, the surety
will have had such notice as is sufficient both under general assignment doctrine and R. F.
Ball Constr. Co., discussed in note 38 supra, to render it liable for the sums covered by
such liens.
41. See note 38 supra.
42. Where conditions exist which raise the likelihood of on-the-job accidents and
these conditions are known to the employer, a duty to inspect and hence constructive
notice of any related improper or negligent acts of the independent contractor is often
imposed. Foreseeability of the particular type of injury increases the need for inspection.
See Annot., 30 A.L.R. 1502, 1531 (1924) (general discussion of liability for unlawful
acts). Similarly, once the government has filed a notice of lien, the likelihood that the
contractor's tax delinquency will continue in the future seems strong enough to warrant
imposing on the surety a duty to inspect. The surety then may have actual knowledge
of further failure to pay. For where the terms of the assignment are actually carried out,
the surety will have access to the contractor's progress reports. He can tally the payroll
and other payments, plus their correlative taxes, with the funds taken in. Additional
powers to inspect the contractor's books and general credit standing should be made a
prerequisite to granting the bond. See Rudolph, supra note 29. And the duty to inspect,
coupled with the surety's ability through inspection to insure that current taxes are paid,
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Adoption of the proposed theory will induce the government to give the
surety prompt notice of any tax delinquencies, either by filing notice of its liens
or by informing the surety directly.43 And since, under the solution proposed,
the surety's immunity from loss due to liens for past taxes is predicated on
its taking a present assignment, the surety cannot escape liability for current
taxes by deferring the effective time of the assignment.
Construing the customary assignment as creating an employer-independent
contractor relationship will secure substantial advantages to all of the parties
concerned. Under the present tax-lien statute, only this construction of the
assignment provides the incentive for the federal government to give prompt
notice of its lien. Notice in turn permits a comprehensive system of loss con-
trol which will guard all of the parties--owner, surety and tax collector-from
loss caused by the contractor defaulting with large debts outstanding. And
timely notice, by enabling the owner and surety to replace the contractor as
soon as he becomes financially unstable, may avoid much of the costly interrup-
tion of the job which characteristically follows an unexpected default.
should be sufficient to charge the surety with constructive notice of any subsequent de-
ficiencies. Thus any loss stemming from the first lien would fall upon the government, all
subsequent loss on the surety, thereby putting a premium on prompt filing by the govern-
ment.
Alternatively, the employer-surety may be held responsible under the general doctrine
which imposes liability for any injury flowing from having hired or, after having notice
of the contractor's condition, having retained a financially incompetent contractor. See
Annot., 30 A.L.R. 1502, 1544 (1924) (financial irresponsibility of independent contractors
generally) ; Morris, The Torts of anr Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339, 344
(1934) ; Steffen, Independent Contractor and The Good Life, 2 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 501, 505
(1935). Though usually considered only in relation to tort liability and, more particularly,
to physical injury and property damage, employer liability for the acts of an incompetent
(financially or otherwise) independent contractor has occured in other areas as well.
Ferson, Liability of Employers for Misrepresentations made by "Independent Coo.-
tractors," 3 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1949) (contract mispresentation, false representations by
brokers, incompetence of hired physicians and incorrect translations of newspaper articles).
43. The surety should not, however, be subject to any of the criminal penalties
provided for in the federal tax statutes. See Annot., 30 A.L.R. 1502, 1531 (1924) (liability
for unlawful acts limited to financial loss). The penalties imposed by the tax statutes,
see note 26 supra, are discretionary with the court. Since tax liability here is imposed
solely to prevent and to distribute loss, penal sanctions can serve no justifiable purpose.
Furthermore, the statutes are directed towards "willful" failure, "willful" evasion, etc.;
that such "willfulness" could be attributed to the surety who is made liable only by
virtue of an imposed duty to inspect after notice, real or constructive, seems doubtful.
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